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NOTES
statute or ordinance a plaintiff must have his land fenced in be-
fore he can recover for damage done by trespassing cattle.25
In the instant case the court was faced with the problem of
determining the duty imposed on a cattle owner in the absence of
a local ordinance. The court stated that a duty is imposed upon
the defendant to show he was without the slightest fault. But the
court then announced that a cattle owner is not to be treated as
an insurer against all damage caused by his cattle. Here the cat-
tle owner had not kept a part of the fence in sufficient repair,
because of the fencing agreement; this was the only "fault" im-
puted to defendant, yet the court would have held him liable.26
Thus the court demands a very high degree of care; such a de-
mand is understandable in light of the growing population leav-
ing fewer areas where an unfenced herd of cattle is the normal
thing. This case seems contrary to the decision of the two Louisi-
ana cases which require the owner of the damaged property to
fence in his property before he can claim damages. The decision
explicitly states that the agreement whereby defendant was not
responsible for the upkeep of the part of the fence through which
the cattle escaped would not relieve defendant of his duty to keep
his cattle properly enclosed.2 7 Apparently plaintiff need have no
fence at all.
Sam J. Friedman
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - SCOPE OF THE LOUISIANA STATUTE
- DEFINITION OF BUSINESS
Plaintiff sustained injuries while employed by defendant in
the construction of defendant's residence, the only one defend-
25. Parrott v. Babb, 132 So. 377 (La. App. 1931) ; Morgan v. Patin, 47 So.2d
91 (La. App. 1950). See Note, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 316, 318 (1954):
"Where . . . there is no [ordinance preventing stock from running at large,] it is
up to the property owner to fence the livestock off his premises, and plaintiff must
show that his property was enclosed with a sufficient fence before he can recover
for damage done by trespassing animals."
26. At common law where an owner of land is bound by agreement to maintain
a fence, and through defects in it his neighbor's cattle enter upon his land and do
damage, without the fault of the owner, as a general rule, it may be said that the
landowner cannot recover therefor. If a partition fence has been divided and a
particular portion assigned to each of the adjacent proprietors to keep in repair,
each is liable for trespasses committed only through defects in his own part of the
fence. Only when cattle escape through that part of the fence to be maintained
by the plaintiff is the cattle owner relieved of liability for his trespassing cattle.
See 2 HARPFR & JAMES, TORTS 829, § 14.10 (1956). Louisiana cases on this point
could not be found; the instant case holds that a fencing agreement would not
relieve a cattle owner from liability. Apparently in the absence of a local ordi-
nance, this should be taken as the Louisiana position.
27. See note 26 aupra.
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ant had ever built. A regular employee of a federal agency, de-
fendant used nine weeks of accumulated leave for the construc-
tion of his home. He hired and supervised plaintiff and seven
other carpenters to work full time on the project for the nine-
week period. In an action against defendant's compensation
insurer, the court of appeal held that the injury occurred in the
course of the employer's business, and therefore granted com-
pensation,1 upon the ground that the employer had made the
work his business by engaging full time for a considerable period
of time in work that would ordinarily be performed by a con-
tractor. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, held, reversed. The
activity was not the employer's business because the house was
built for his personal use with no intention of selling it for a
profit. To grant compensation in such a case would not be in
accord with the economic principle of the workmen's compensa-
tion statute. McMorris v. Home Indemnity Ins. Co., 107 So.2d
645 (La. 1959).
The basic purpose of the Louisiana workmen's compensation
statute is to relieve employees of accident costs by shifting the
burden to groups of the public through employers.2 The statute
contemplates that this distribution of accident costs will be made
through business channels as an element of the cost of produc-
tion. This is reflected in the requirement that an employment
must be in the course of the employer's trade, business, or occu-
pation in order for the employer to be subject to compensation
liability.3 Because the phrase "trade, business, or occupation"
has no simple, definite meaning, 4 its meaning must be deter-
1. McMorris v. Home Indemnity Ins. Co., 94 So.2d 471 (La. App. 1957).
2. Puchner v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 198 La. 921, 5 So.2d 288
(1941) ; Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Board, 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938) ;
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 32 (1951); 1 LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 1 (1952).
3. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950) : "The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply
to every person performing services arising out of and incidental to his employment
in the course of his employer's trade, business or occupation in the -following
hazardous trades, businesses or occupations: . . . ." As indicated by the above-
quoted provision, Louisiana also exempts non-hazardous employments, an exemption
which became entangled with the non-business exemption in cases involving the
repair or construction of business properties. This problem is beyond the scope
of this Note, except to point out that the case of Landry v. Fuselier, 230 La. 271,
88 So.2d 218 (1956), discussed in Malone, Torts and Workmen'8 Compensation, 17
LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 345, 353 (1957), has tended to clarify the problem by
holding that regular repair or reconstruction work in connection with a nonhazard-
ous business constituted a separate hazardous business. Cf. MALONE, LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 102 (1951).
4. "The term 'business' has no definite or legal meaning. It is a general term
with widely variegated meanings." Meyers v. S.W. Regional Conf. Ass'n of Seventh
Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 319, 88 So.2d 381, 384 (1956).
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mined in particular cases in the light of the statute's purpose.5
Where an employer is engaged in selling goods or services at a
profit, it is clear that the pursuit constitutes a trade, business,
or occupation because he is in a position to pass the cost of com-
pensation liability to his customers as an element of the cost of
production.6 Conversely, where an employment is solely for the
personal benefit of the employer, such as for home repairs, it is
not in the course of business.7 However, the compensation prin-
ciple does not necessarily require that the employer be selling
something for a profit in order for the activity to constitute a
business. It suffices if there is a group, receiving the benefits
and paying the costs of the operation, to whom the ultimate bur-
den of compensation costs can be shifted. Thus, because the costs
of a church are borne by a number of contributors who enjoy its
spiritual services, it has been held that a large non-profit church
association is a business. 8 Similarly, since the costs and benefits
5. The court of appeal opinion in the Meyers case, 8upra, was predicated upon
the reasoning that it would be a violation of the economic principle underlying
compensation to hold that a church organization was a business. 79 So.2d 595, 595
(La. App. 1955). In reversing the court of appeal opinion, the Supreme Court did
not differ with the approach employed by the court of appeal in construing the
word "business," but differed only in its conclusion that it was not contrary to
the economic principle of the compensation statute to hold that a church was a
business, since the costs of injuries could be passed on to persons supporting the
church. 230 La. 310, 318, 88 So.2d 381, 383 (1956). In reference to the scope of
statutes having the non-business exemption it was said at I LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 740 (1952) : "[Wihatever the statutory background, the courts
will not ordinarily find in the compensation act coverage of work undertaken by
a person as, so to speak, a consumer instead of a producer."
6. The Supreme Court stated in the instant case: "Since the employer in the
instant case was not constructing the house for sale at a profit . . . it cannot be
concluded that he was engaged in construction work as a trade, business or occupa-
tion." 107 So.2d 645, 647 (La. 1959). No statements were found in cases prior
to the instant case which squarely advanced the proposition of the above text
statement, but such was the clear implication of those cases which held that em-
ployments for the purely personal purposes of the employer were not within the
meaning of employment in the trade or business of the employer. See note 7 infra.
As to the repair or reconstruction of business or rental properties, even though
there is a profit motive, such activity may not comprise a business where the
principal business is not hazardous. But as pointed out in note 3 supra the prob-
lem was one largely enmeshed in the hazardous business requirement. It is clear
that no matter how brief or unstable the employment where the hazardous problem
is not present, it should have no effect on the problem of what is a business. See
Hayes v. Barras, 6 So.2d 66 (La. App. 1941) (plaintiff hired for single job of
loading truck).
7. The landmark case, with facts similar to those of the instant case, was
Shipp v. Bordelon, 152 La. 795, 94 So. 399 (1922) (repair of personal residence
of physician not a business). Other cases involving similar holdings to the effect
that work undertaken for personal motives does not constitute a business are
Brooks v. Smith, 41 So.2d 800 (La. App. 1949) ; Prater v. Sun Indemnity Co.,
38 So.2d 663 (La. App. 1949) ; Gerstmayr v. Kolb, 158 So. 647 (La. App. 1935) ;
Charity Hospital v. Morgan, 143 So. 508 (La. App. 1932) ; Lay v. Pugh, 119 So.
456 (La. App. 1928).
8. Meyers v. S.W. Regional Conf. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La.
310, 88 So.2d 381 (1956).
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of government are distributed among the public, the statute ex-
pressly applies to public employments.9
Broad language in two Supreme Court opinions' ° suggested
the possibility that any sustained or regular undertaking of an
employer would constitute a business, a notion in conflict with the
purpose of the Louisiana statute insofar as it might subject an
employer to compensation liability in a situation where there is
no one to whom the burden could be shifted as an element of cost
or price. In Landry v. Fuselier," after having found that an em-
ployment connected with the repair of business properties was in
the course of the employer's business, the court added the
thought that because of the regularity of the repair work it con-
stituted a business in and of itself.' 2 In Meyers v. Southwest Re-
gional Conf. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 3 the court used
language which also suggested that any sustained or time-con-
suming undertaking would constitute a business. 4 Both cases
involved fact situations wherein the burden of compensation
could be shifted from the employer to a group. 5 Therefore, the
9. LA. R.S. 23:1034 (1950). See Meyers v. Southwest Regional Conf. Ass'n
of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 318, 88 So.2d 381, 383 (1956) : "The
Act . . . does not, either in letter or spirit, limit its scope to businesses conducted
for profit. [R.S. 23:1034] manifests that it was never intended . . . that the Act
was to be confined to individuals and corporations engaged only in trades or busi-
nesses operated for a profit."
10. See notes 12 and 14 infra.
11. 230 La. 271, 88 So.2d 218 (1956).
12. Landry v. Fuselier, 230 La. 271, 279, 88 So.2d 218, 221 (1956) : "Thus,
the construction activities of Fuselier involved in repairs and construction of his
business premises were a regular part of his economic activities." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) The court of appeal opinion by Judge Tate, which was adopted as the
opinion of the Supreme Court, took particular note of the evidence tending to show
the regularity with which the employer engaged in repair and reconstruction work.
Also, there was language which suggested that Shipp v. Bordelon, 152 La. 795,
94 So. 399 (1922), the landmark case holding that private ventures were not busi-
nesses where there was no motive to produce an item for sale, was weakened by
subsequent decisions. However, in the Landry case there was an already admit-
tedly existing business, and clearly a profit motive. Also, as indicated in note 3
supra, the Landry case was the last case among a chain of decisions dealing with
unique problems resulting from the confusion of the hazardous and business re-
quirements. It seems that there the stability or duration of employer activity
does play a part in certain limited situations involving the hazardous business
problem.
13. 230 La. 310, 88 So.2d 381 (1956).
14. Quoting from Webster's Dictionary, the court in Meyers v. Southwest Re-
gional Conf. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 319, 88 So.2d 381, 384
(1956), noted that business has been defined as "that which busies, or engages
time, attention, or labor, as a principal serious concern or interest." It is sub-
mitted that in using this language the court was doing so in an effort to support
a holding in a case of first instance in Louisiana and did not intend to formulate
a broad rule to the effect that all that busies is a business. However, the language
could conceivably be taken to mean that non-profit enterprises will not be consid-
ered businesses unless they have some duration or stability.
15. In the Landry case, the work was connected with a filling station business
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result of these decisions conformed with the compensation prin-
ciple, although their language seemingly conflicts with that prin-
ciple.
In the instant case, the court of appeal relied upon the Meyers
and Landry cases to support its holding that the housebuilding
project constituted a business of the employer because of the con-
siderable amount of time and effort which he had devoted to it.' 8
In a project of such duration and complexity, the work is ordi-
narily undertaken by a professional contractor. Therefore the
court of appeal seemed to feel that in order to afford compensa-
tion protection to workers who would ordinarily be engaged in
business employments, it should be held that the employer had
entered the construction business. 17 In reversing the court of
appeal, the Supreme Court centered its opinion upon the fact
that the house was constructed as a personal residence for the
employer, and not for sale at a profit, 8 a fact which was consid-
ered immaterial by the court of appeal. 19 The Meyers and Lan-
dry cases were distinguishable in that the compensation prin-
ciple was not violated; in the instant case, the ultimate burden
of accident costs could not be shifted from the employer to any-
one as an element of cost or price.2 0
It is interesting to note that the result reached by the court
of appeal would have been reached under the compensation stat-
utes of a majority of the states. It is commonly provided that
only casual non-business employments are excluded from the
scope of compensation legislation. 2' Such statutes seem to recog-
which was engaged in selling at a profit. See note 6 supra. In the Meyers case,
the court considered that the supporters of the church constituted a group to whom
the cost of accident risks could be passed. See note 5 supra.
16. 94 So.2d 471, 477 (La. App. 1957).
17. Id. at 476-77: "Whether one intends to construct a house for rent, for sale
or for personal use, when he actually . . . acts as architect, contractor or foreman
* * I and devotes his entire time and attention . . . which took nine to ten weeks,
it constituted a 'trade, business or occupation'. Where one engaged in the con-
tract business, although it be for the purpose of building his own home . . . , rather
than employing a general contractor, then his employees came under the protection
of the employer's liability law."
18. 107 So.2d 645, 647 (La. 1959).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. 107 So.2d 645, 647 (La. 1959).
21. Twenty-four states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have
this type of exclusion. See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 50.10, n. 66
(1952). In addition or in lieu of this type exclusion, a great variety of exemptions
are sometimes contained in the statutes.
Among the various specific exemptions which have been included either singly
or in various combinations in the statutes of the different states are those relating
to domestic service, agricultural employment, casual employment, employment not
in the course of the employer's trade, business, or occupation, specified minimum
1959) 741
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nize, in effect, that where there is a sustained non-business em-
ployment, the employer can use insurance as a means of avoiding
the full burden of accident risks connected with the employment.
The Louisiana statute does not reflect so liberal a view because
its scope is expressly confined to business employments without
any mention of their duration or regularity.2 2 The relatively con-
servative approach 28 of the Louisiana statute is perhaps ex-
plained by the fact that it was enacted early in the history of
compensation in the United States at a time when the constitu-
tionality of such statutes was in doubt.24 In view of the back-
ground and phrasing of the statute, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court correctly interpreted the statute as excluding
from its scope all employments of a personal nature, without
regard to the duration of the employment activity.
The decision is also sound in that it prevents non-business
employers from having to decide at their peril whether their per-
sonal undertakings are of sufficient regularity or duration to be
"businesses" in need of compensation insurance. However, the
decision leaves non-business employees without any compensa-
tion protection and exposes non-business employers to unlimited
tort liability. The statute makes no provision for such employ-
ers and employees to elect to come within the act.25 There ap-
pears to be no policy reason for making it impossible for the
employer in the instant case to provide compensation protection
number of employees, non-hazardous employment, non-profit employers, charitable
employers, highly paid employees, corporate executives, and public employments.
A table reflecting the importance of these various specific exemptions and indicat-
ing which of them are contained in the statutes of which states is contained in 1
id. at § 50.10.
22. The Louisiana statute makes no mention of casual employees, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court has clearly indicated that casual business employees
are within the scope of the statute. Langley v. Findley, 207 La. 307, 21 So.2d 229
(1944). The only consideration, apart from the hazardous business problem, is
whether the employment was in the course of a trade, business, or occupation. LA.
R.S. 23:1035 (1950). No cases were found which would indicate that the Louisi-
ana statute was ever intended or broadened to include non-casual, non-business
employments. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 55 (1951),
wherein it is indicated that no matter how brief a business employment may be,
it falls within the statute.
23. A further indication of the relatively conservative nature of the Louisiana
statute is the hazardous business requirement. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950). Only a
minority of the states have this requirement. 1 LARSON, WoRKMEX'S COMPENSA-
TION § 50.10 (1952).
24. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 34 (1951).
25. The election provisions of the Louisiana statute apply only as to the haz-
ardous exclusionary feature. Employers and employees in non-hazardous businesses
can agree to come within the statute, but no provision is made for employers and
employees in non-business situations to bring themselves within the statute. See
LA. R.S. 23:1036 (1950). But 8ee Lay v. Pugh, 9 La. App. 183, 119 So. 456
(1929).
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for his workers through procuring compensation insurance. It
is submitted that it would be well to enable non-business employ-
ers to furnish such protection. Rather than require a formal
election agreement, a simpler device would be to provide that
employments covered by compensation insurance need not be of
a business nature. A precedent for this type of provision is the
recent amendment which estops insurers from asserting the non-
hazardous nature of a business in connection with the hazardous
business requirement.26 The suggested amendment would not be
a very substantial departure from the economic principle under-
lying the statute. Although it would not be in accord with the
objective of distributing accident costs through business chan-
nels, it would be in accord with a more basic aspect of the com-
pensation principle. It would provide a voluntary means - in-
surance - whereby the burden of accident costs could be shifted
from the employee to a group.
Fred W. Ellis
26. LA. R.S. 23:1166 (Supp. 1958), as added by La. Acts 1958, No. 495.
19591
